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Abstract
This paper presents a simple new method for measuring ‘wealth e￿ects’ on aggregate
consumption. The method exploits the stickiness of consumption growth (sometimes
interpreted as re￿ecting consumption ‘habits’) to distinguish between immediate and eventual
wealth e￿ects. In U.S. data, we estimate that the immediate (next-quarter) marginal
propensity to consume from a $1 change in housing wealth is about 2 cents, with a ￿nal
eventual e￿ect around 9 cents, substantially larger than the e￿ect of shocks to ￿nancial wealth.
We argue that our method is preferable to cointegration-based approaches, because neither
theory nor evidence supports faith in the existence of a stable cointegrating vector.
Keywords Housing Wealth, Wealth E￿ect, Consumption Dynamics, As-
set Prices
JEL codes E21, E32, C225
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1283
December 2010
Non-technical Summary
This paper presents a simple new method for measuring ‘wealth e￿ects’ on aggregate
consumption. The method exploits the sluggishness of consumption growth (sometimes
interpreted as re￿ecting consumption ‘habits’) to distinguish between immediate and
eventual wealth e￿ects. In U.S. data, we estimate that the immediate (next-quarter)
marginal propensity to consume from a $1 change in housing wealth is about 2 cents,
with a ￿nal eventual e￿ect around 9 cents, substantially larger than the e￿ect of shocks
to ￿nancial wealth.
We argue that our method is preferable to cointegration-based approaches for at least
two reasons. First, basic consumption theory does not imply the existence of a stable
cointegrating vector; in particular, a change in the long-run growth rate or the long-run
interest rate should change the relationship between consumption, income, and wealth.
Second, even if changes to the cointegrating vector are ruled out by assumption, changes
in any other feature of the economy relevant for the consumption/saving decision can
generate such long-lasting dynamics that hundreds or thousands of years of data should
be required to obtain reliable estimates of that vector.
Even for the U.S., the technological leader and therefore the most stable advanced
country in the modern era, the 50 year span of available data has seen major changes
in productivity growth, interest tax rates, demographics, ￿nancial markets, social insur-
ance, and every other aspect of reality that theory says should matter for consumption
(not to mention fundamental changes in measurement methods for the underlying NIPA
data).
Motivated by these concerns, we introduce an alternative methodology for estimating
wealth e￿ects. The method’s foundation derives from the recent literature documenting
substantial ‘excess smoothness’ (or ‘stickiness’) in consumption growth, relative to the
benchmark random walk model. Our model can be thought of as a proposal for unifying
the ‘stickiness’ and the ‘wealth e￿ects’ literatures, by resolving wealth e￿ects into two
key aspects: Speed and strength.
Our measure of ‘speed’ is meant to distill and quantify the core point of the stickiness
literature: Consumption responds to shocks more slowly than implied by the random-
walk benchmark. Given an estimated ‘speed,’ our measure of the ‘strength’ of wealth
e￿ects is thus dependent on the horizon; our ‘speed’ estimates imply that the immediate
spending e￿ects of wealth ￿uctuations are much smaller than the eventual e￿ects. In
particular, we ￿nd that the immediate (next-quarter) marginal propensity to consume
from a $1 change in housing wealth is about 2 cents, with an eventual e￿ect amounting
to 9 cents. Consistent with several other recent studies, we ￿nd a housing wealth e￿ect
that is larger than the ￿nancial wealth e￿ect, which we estimate to be about 6 cents on
the dollar.
These di￿ering estimates suggest that markets and policymakers worried about wealth
e￿ects may need to pay careful attention not only to the size of overall changes in total
wealth but also to how those wealth changes break down between di￿erent asset classes.6
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom says that the response of household spending to a shock to wealth
(the ‘wealth e￿ect’) has historically been around 3 to 5 cents on the dollar in the U.S.
1
However, much of the evidence for this proposition comes from ‘cointegrating’ models
that regress the level of consumption on the levels of wealth and income.
2;3
We argue that cointegration methods are problematic for estimating wealth e￿ects,
for at least two reasons.
4 First, basic consumption theory does not imply the existence of
a stable cointegrating vector; in particular, a change in the long-run growth rate or the
long-run interest rate should change the relationship between consumption, income, and
wealth.
5 Second, even if changes to the cointegrating vector are ruled out by assumption,
changes in any other feature of the economy relevant for the consumption/saving decision
can generate such long-lasting dynamics that hundreds or thousands of years of data
should be required to obtain reliable estimates of that vector.
Even for the U.S., the technological leader and therefore the most stable advanced
country in the modern era, the 50 year span of available data has seen major changes
in productivity growth, interest tax rates, demographics, ￿nancial markets, social insur-
ance, and every other aspect of reality that theory says should matter for consumption
(not to mention fundamental changes in measurement methods for the underlying NIPA
data).
Motivated by these concerns, we introduce an alternative methodology for estimating
wealth e￿ects. The method’s foundation derives from the recent literature documenting
substantial ‘excess smoothness’ (or ‘stickiness’) in consumption growth, relative to the
benchmark random walk model.
6 Our model can be thought of as a proposal for unifying
the ‘stickiness’ and the ‘wealth e￿ects’ literatures, by resolving wealth e￿ects into two
key aspects: Speed and strength.
Our measure of ‘speed’ is meant to distill and quantify the core point of the stickiness
literature: Consumption responds to shocks more slowly than implied by the random-
1This statement applies to the macroeconomics literature, cf. Davis and Palumbo (2001) and references therein.
Results using microeconomic data are more heterogeneous; see Khalifa (2004) for capsule summaries of the literature at
the time of the original drafting of this paper, and section 3.3 below for further discussion.
2This method was popular in the ￿rst generation of Keynesian econometric models from the 1950s; in the 1970s it
was given rigorous econometric foundations and dubbed the ‘cointegrating’ approach, or (by a di￿erent tribe) the ‘error
correction’ approach. It gained further respectability when Campbell and Mankiw (1989) developed a theoretical model
that assumed that the ratio of human wealth to nonhuman wealth was stationary (although the theory they used provides
no reason why that ratio should be stable; stability was an auxiliary assumption rather than an implication of their
model).
3The number of papers applying the cointegration methodology has recently risen considerably. References include
Bertaut (2002), Byrne and Davis (2003), Fernandez-Corugedo, Price, and Blake (2003), Pichette and Tremblay (2003),
Catte, Girouard, Price, and Andre (2004), Lettau and Ludvigson (2004), Hamburg, Ho￿mann, and Keller (2005).
4Any purported estimation of ‘wealth e￿ects’ should re￿ect an acute awareness of the possibility (maybe, likelihood)
that the putative ‘e￿ect’ actually captures the in￿uence of some omitted variable, like credit conditions (cf. Muellbauer
(2007), Aron, Duca, Muellbauer, Murata, and Murphy (2008)) or growth expectations (Disney, Gathergood, and Henley
(2010)). This footnote performs that duty; we mostly refrain from further apologies in the remainder of the text. See
Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles (2009) for such a critique.
5See Rudd and Whelan (2006) and Slacalek (2009) for empirical evidence of instability in the cointegrating vector.
6The empirical literature on the sluggishness of consumption starts with Flavin (1981) and Campbell and Deaton
(1989). Recent research suggests that this stylized fact can be alternatively explained by habit formation (see, e.g., Fuhrer,
2000; Chetty and Szeidl, 2005; Sommer, 2007) or inattentiveness (see, e.g., Carroll and Slacalek, 2006; Reis, 2006 and
Sims, 2003).7
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walk benchmark. Given an estimated ‘speed,’ our measure of the ‘strength’ of wealth
e￿ects is thus dependent on the horizon; our ‘speed’ estimates imply that the immediate
spending e￿ects of wealth ￿uctuations are much smaller than the eventual e￿ects.
7 In
particular, we ￿nd that the immediate (next-quarter) marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) from a $1 change in housing wealth is about 2 cents, with an eventual e￿ect
amounting to 9 cents. Consistent with several other recent studies, we ￿nd a housing
wealth e￿ect that is larger than the ￿nancial wealth e￿ect, which we estimate to be
about 6 cents on the dollar.
These di￿ering estimates suggest that markets and policymakers worried about wealth
e￿ects may need to pay careful attention not only to the size of overall changes in total
wealth but also to how those wealth changes break down between di￿erent asset classes.
2 A Theoretical Sketch
This section uses a simple model of consumption to illustrate why a cointegrating
approach may not correctly identify the wealth e￿ect (even when it exists), and shows
how the new method that we propose addresses this shortcoming.
2.1 The Frictionless Model
In the benchmark perfect foresight model with no uncertainty, perfect capital markets,
homogenous consumers and no bequest motive, steady-state consumption is proportional
to overall resources. If total resources are the sum of nonmarket (human) wealth H H H and
market wealth B B B, spending is given by
C C Ct = (H H Ht +B B Bt); (1)
where  is a constant determined by preferences and the after-tax interest factor R =
1 + r (assumed here to be constant).
8 In the version of the model with in￿nitely lived
consumers, constant relative risk aversion , and the discount factor  = 1
1+# the MPC






If labor income is expected to grow at a constant rate g, then (in the continuous-
time approximation) H H Ht will be given by Pt=(r   g) where Pt is the current value of
‘permanent’ labor income, and (1) becomes





Pt + B B Bt: (2)
This model can be extended to the case with i.i.d. interest rates (cf. Merton (1969)
and Samuelson (1969)), which adds a term to the formula for  but does not change the
7By ‘eventual’ we mean the e￿ects after a few years; we are skeptical that our methods (or anyone else’s) can extract
much true ‘long run’ (in￿nite horizon) information from macroeconomic data, for all the reasons mentioned above.
8The derivations in this section are standard, and can be found, for example, in the lecture notes on the ￿rst author’s
web page.8
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structure of (2). In this case the stochastic interest rate would result in ‘wealth shocks’
to B B Bt.
The cointegrating approach to estimating the model would be to assume that con-
sumption is determined by an equation like (2) plus an error perhaps re￿ecting transitory
shocks to consumption or measurement problems, leading to a regression of the form
C C Ct = 0 + 1Y Y Y t + 2B B Bt + "t
under the assumption that current income Y Y Y t proxies for Pt and with the hope that the
coe￿cient 2 will uncover the MPC out of wealth, . (This is of course a simpli￿cation
of actual practice, but it captures the essence of the method.)
Unfortunately, almost any attempt to make the model more realistic destroys the
prediction that there is a time-invariant ‘wealth e￿ect’ coe￿cient . In the simple model
sketched above, it is clear that any sustained change in g, r, , or # during the estimation
interval would pose serious problems because no time-invariant  exists even under the
usual maintained assumption that movements in B B Bt represent exogenous shocks; this
point holds with even greater force if those ‘wealth shocks’ to B B B are correlated with
persistent movements in g, r, , or # (as asset pricing theory suggests they will be).
9
Even if we assume perpetual constancy in g, r, , and #, the model’s prediction of a
time-invariant  can be destroyed by the introduction of labor income uncertainty, time-
varying after-tax interest rates, demographics, or many other real-world complications.
Such concerns are given further force by the large econometric literature on ‘spurious
signi￿cance’ that can result from regressing non-stationary variables on each other, the
upshot of which is that econometric tests may appear to detect a signi￿cant relationship
even when the variables are actually independent.
As a speci￿c illustration of the problem we are concerned about, consider the following
scenario, illustrated in ￿gures 1(a) and 1(b). (Plain solid lines show the reactions of
consumption and wealth (normalized by income; hence nonbold) for the ‘frictionless’
model sketched above.) The economy starts in period 1 in a steady state balanced
growth equilibrium in which B = 0 and C = 1, and stays in that equilibrium for 4
periods. In period 5 it is hit with a 1-unit positive shock to wealth so that B5 = 1.
The economy evolves with no further shocks for n = 20 quarters, then in period 25
experiences a permanent increase in income growth g.
10 The simulation runs for another
20 periods, ending in period 45.
11
9It is plausible, however, to suppose that these parameters are likely to change only gradually over time. Thus, any
change in the cointegrating vector is likely to be gradual. Under these circumstances, an estimation method that allows
for the cointegrating vetor to evolve gradually might actually perform reasonably well; to see an attempt at an estimation
along these lines, see the smart estimation method explored in Aron, Duca, Muellbauer, Murata, and Murphy (2008). It
would be interesting to test how well this method performs under plausible assumptions about the degree of drift in the
coe￿cients on the cointegrating vector, but such an exercise is beyond the scope of the present paper.
10The size of the ￿rst shock (the wealth shock) is arbitrarily set equal to 1 unit of permanent
income. The income growth shock is an increase from 1.5 to 2.5 percent per year, roughly matching
the rise in the ten-year productivity growth rate expected by the respondents to the Survey of
Professional Forecasters between the early 1990s and the year 2001. (The annualized ten-year ahead
forecast of productivity growth increased from 1.52 percent in 1996 to 2.48 percent in 2001, see http:
//www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/data-files/PROD10/.)
11These simulations are described in more detail in the document simulationsWithStickyC.pdf in the replication
archive.9
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Consumption adjusts upward immediately (in period 5) to the period-5 wealth shock;
both consumption and wealth remain constant thereafter. Thus, the size of the ‘wealth
e￿ect’  on consumption can be measured directly by comparing the change in con-
sumption to the change in wealth. This is the ‘best-case scenario’ for measuring a
wealth e￿ect.
The expected growth rate of income g is the object that we modify in order to produce
our experiment’s second shock. When this positive growth shock hits, consumption
jumps up to a much higher level; but nonhuman wealth B begins to fall, because, now,
spending exceeds income. This dissaving re￿ects the ‘human wealth’ e￿ect emphasized
by Summers (1981): When consumers become more optimistic about future income
growth, they start spending today on the basis of their anticipated future riches. But
as consumption continues to exceed current income, the ratio of nonhuman wealth to
income B declines, and the ratio of consumption to income C also declines. Both C and
B thus embark on downward trajectories after the shock; but B falls starting from its
pre-shock level, while C starts falling only after having made a one-time upward leap
because of the human wealth e￿ect.
This experiment provides a clear example in which, even though a ‘marginal propensity
to consume out of wealth’ unambiguously exists (  0:014) in the underlying structural
model, it cannot be uncovered by estimating a supposed ‘cointegrating’ regression of
consumption on wealth. Indeed, the coe￿cient obtained from such a regression would
actually be negative, because after the positive income-growth shock, consumption is
higher on average than before the shock, while average wealth after the shock is lower
than before the shock.
Table 1 presents the quantitative results for the ( n = 20) experiment illustrated in
the ￿gures, as well as for similar experiments with 40 and 60 quarters.
12 As long as
the shocks occur more frequently than about every 15 years ( = 60 quarters), regressions
of consumption C on wealth B estimate a negative wealth e￿ect, even though the true
parameter of interest is about 0.014. While cointegrating regressions eventually do
provide consistent estimates as n approaches in￿nity and if there are no more shocks,
Table 1 suggests that convergence of the cointegrating estimates to the truth is likely to
be too slow to make cointegration estimation a reliable method of uncovering structural
parameters (even if they exist) over the (relatively) short spans of time captured in
actual empirical macroeconomic datasets.
2.2 The Sticky Expectations Model
This section argues that if there is a reliable degree of ‘stickiness’ in consumption growth,
an estimation method that relies upon that stickiness to estimate wealth e￿ects using
high- and medium-frequency data is less likely to be led astray by a ‘regime change’
(like the one examined above) than a full-sample estimation technique like cointegration
estimation.
12The table presents estimates for the frictionless model; similar estimates can be found for model with inattentive
consumers described below.10
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Consumption habits are the leading explanation for sluggishness in aggregate con-
sumption. But an alternative explanation is that households may be mildly inattentive
to macroeconomic developments￿for example, some households may not immediately
notice shocks to aggregate macroeconomic indicators such as productivity growth or
the unemployment rate. Carroll and Slacalek (2006) simulate an economy consisting of
a continuum of such inattentive but otherwise-standard CRRA-utility consumers, each
of whom updates the information about his permanent income with probability  in
each period. They show that the change in the log of aggregate consumption, logC C Ct,
approximately follows an AR(1) process, whose autocorrelation coe￿cient approximates
the share of consumers (1   ) who do not have up-to-date information:
logC C Ct =  + (1   )
| {z }

logC C Ct 1 + "t: (3)
Exactly the same approximation can be obtained for some models of habit-forming
consumers, e.g., Muellbauer (1988) and Dynan (2000), but the coe￿cient  in those
models measures the intensity of the habit motive. When we estimate a model of the form
of equation (3), our estimates cannot distinguish between these alternative hypotheses
about the reason for stickiness.
13 But, from the standpoint of forecasting aggregate
consumption dynamics, it may not matter whether the right explanation of stickiness is
habits or inattention.
As an illustration of how our estimation method works, consider the behavior of
aggregate consumption and wealth in the same economy described in the previous
section, except that consumption is now that of inattentive households who update
their information on average once a year (i.e.,  = 0:25 or  = 0:75). The dashed
lines in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the gradual adjustment of the two variables, which
occurs because some consumers remain unaware of the shocks for several quarters. This
sluggishness provides an informative signal to identify parameters of interest.
Table 2 uses an equation like the one we will estimate empirically below,
C C Ct = Et 2 C C Ct 1 + B B Bt 1 + "t;
to estimate the strength of the impact of wealth  and the speed  in simulated data.
14
(We explain below why we use B B Bt 1 rather than B B Bt as the second regressor.) The
regression captures the essence of our estimation approach, whose empirical implemen-
tation is detailed in section 3. The two key ￿ndings in the table are: (i) the stickiness
parameter  lies close to its true value, and (ii) the estimates of the wealth e￿ect are
broadly in line with the ‘true’ value calculated from the calibrated parameters, 0.014. As
for the latter, the estimated wealth e￿ect decreases somewhat for n = 60, which suggests
that enough shocks are needed to identify the parameters; but, shocks presumably arrive
13See Carroll and Slacalek (2006) for arguments that microeconomic data suggest sticky expectations rather than
habits are the right explanation.
14We take the expectation of lagged consumption growth because in a small sample with only two shocks, the coe￿cient
estimates from an OLS regression would be severely biased by the tendency of OLS to want to ￿t the ex-post experience.
If we had a large number of shocks in our example, this problem would be smaller, but we wanted to keep the example
as simple and ‘toylike’ as possible to aid comprehension. And since our empirical work below will regress consumption
on the expectation of lagged consumption, using Et 2 C C Ct 1 increases the coherence between our exercises on simulated
and empirical data.11
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in the real world more often than once every 60 periods (15 years), so this ￿nding is not
especially troubling for our hopes of estimating the model with empirical data.
We should emphasize here that the foregoing is presented more in the spirit of illus-
tration of our ideas than as a rigorous treatment of a theoretical model. We think of our
method as a ￿rst stab at the problem of providing a robust but cointegration-free method
for estimating dynamic wealth e￿ects, and we hope that more rigorous modeling and
structural estimation will follow. But we anticipate that such approaches will con￿rm
the basic dynamics captured by our method, in part because we think those dynamics
have been re￿ected in the results obtained in most of the recent literature on structural
estimation of more complicated macroeconomic models, which invariably ￿nd a strong
component of ‘habit formation.’
Our method also has the advantage that it allows for a transparent generalization
for comparing the e￿ects of shocks to di￿erent kinds of wealth. If housing wealth is
measured by B B Bh
t and ￿nancial wealth by B B B
f
t , our method boils down to estimating
C C Ct+n  C C Ct = (B B B
f
t+n  B B B
f
t )f + (B B B
h
t+n  B B B
h
t)h
which is su￿ciently simple that the respective ’s might almost serve as de￿nitions
rather than estimates of the sizes of the respective wealth e￿ects at the de￿ned horizon
n.
15
3 Estimates Based on Consumption Growth Dynamics
Our estimation approach exploits the robust empirical fact that aggregate consumption
growth responds only sluggishly to shocks. The most persuasive evidence that such
sluggishness exists is the reluctant introduction of habits into quantitative macroeco-
nomic models in the last few years, despite the evident distaste for the habit formation
assumption on the part of many researchers. Models that include habits are proliferating
because they can match the core empirical fact of sluggish consumption growth along
with attendant implications for asset pricing and other empirical phenomena.
In implementing our method in actual data, the ￿rst step is to estimate the degree
of stickiness in consumption growth in (3). But there is a problem: The producer
of the consumption data documents a variety of sources of measurement error in that
data (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2006). Furthermore, anyone who has been involved
in real-time consumption forecasting knows that there are large transitory elements of
spending (e.g. hurricane-related purchases) that are not incorporated in the theory that
leads to (3).
Fortunately, these problems can be largely overcome when  is estimated with instru-
mental variables estimation using instruments dated t   2 or earlier.
16 These estimates
suggest a serial correlation coe￿cient for ‘true’ consumption growth in the neighborhood
15As noted before, a reasonable objection to this is that movements in B B Bf and B B Bh are not likely to be exogenous in
the econometrically required sense. Hence the need for more sophisticated models.
16As shown by Muellbauer (1988) and Sommer (2007), in a simple habit formation model (like the one sketched
above), time aggregation causes an MA(2) process in consumption growth. But because the MA(2) coe￿cient is generally
small, using instruments as of time t   2 induces essentially no bias, as illustrated in Table 5 below.12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1283
December 2010
of 0.7 (whether the measure of spending is total consumption expenditures, spending
on nondurables and services, or spending on nondurables alone). The evidence below
con￿rms that this ￿nding holds robustly for alternative sets and alternative lags of
instrumental variables.
3.1 Estimating the Wealth E￿ect
To estimate the wealth e￿ect, we must modify Sommer’s methodology in several direc-
tions. First, the ultimate goal here is to obtain an estimate of the marginal propensity
to consume out of wealth. But (3) is written in terms of the growth rate of consumption.
Even if the model were estimated as a just-identi￿ed system where the only instrument
for lagged consumption growth is lagged changes in wealth, the result would be a
relationship between the growth rate of wealth and the growth rate of consumption,
which is not an MPC. Worse, this approach makes no sense if wealth is split up into a
housing and a ￿nancial component. If the null hypothesis is that the MPCs out of the
two components are equal then the coe￿cients on their log changes will not be identical
unless ￿nancial and housing wealth are the same size in every period (in which case their
di￿erential e￿ects would not be identi￿ed!).
There is a simple solution to these problems, which is to use the ratio of changes in
wealth to an initial level of consumption rather than wealth growth.
17 That is, if we
de￿ne
@C C Ct = (C C Ct  C C Ct 1)=C C Ct 5
@B B Bt 1 = (B B Bt 1  B B Bt 2)=C C Ct 5
and so on, then a ￿rst-stage regression of the form
@C C Ct = 0 + 1@B B Bt 1 (4)
yields a direct estimate of the marginal propensity to consume in quarter t out of a
change in wealth in quarter t   1. Furthermore, if B B Bf and B B Bh are the ￿nancial and
housing components of wealth, a ￿rst-stage regression of the form
@C C Ct = 0 + 1@B B B
f
t 1 + 2@B B B
h
t 1 (5)
yields directly comparable estimates of relative MPCs.
The reader may wonder why the wealth variables in ( 5) are lagged one period. This is
for several reasons. First, wealth in our source (the Flow of Funds Accounts) is measured
at a point in time (on the last day of the quarter), while consumption occurs continuously
throughout a quarter. If we were to use a measure of wealth with the same time subscript
as our measure of consumption, in practice that would be incorporating information
that was revealed to the consumer only late in the quarter as though the consumer
could have known about it early in the quarter. Second, there is a potentially serious
simultaneity problem with looking at the relationship between current consumption and
current wealth: Maybe innovations to both are driven by some exogenous unmeasured
17Because we will later be using variables with lags up to a year, the ‘initial’ level here is de￿ned as consumption ￿ve
quarters before the current quarter.13
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third variable (growth expectations, say). Then if asset markets respond instantly to new
information (as they should to prevent arbitrage; the random walk proposition is much
closer to holding true for asset prices than for consumption), the coe￿cient on wealth
would re￿ect some of this simultaneity bias rather than a ‘pure’ marginal propensity to
consume. Finally, the most useful context in which empirical work like this might be
performed is in forecasting high frequency consumption movements. To do that, one
needs to have lagged, not contemporaneous, variables on the right hand side.
Regressions of the form (4) or (5) pass all the standard tests of instrument validity
and therefore justify estimation of an IV equation of the form
@C C Ct =  + @C C Ct 1 + "t (6)
where  is an unimportant constant.
Given an initial (current-quarter) MPC out of wealth of  and a serial correlation
coe￿cient  for @C C C, the usual in￿nite horizon formula implies that the ultimate e￿ect






Our interpretation of the econometric object we call the ‘eventual MPC’ is that it really
re￿ects the medium-run dynamics of consumption (over the course of a few years); that
is, the e￿ects over a time frame short enough that the consequences of the consumption
decisions have not had time to have a substantial impact on the level of wealth and to
induce general equilibrium o￿sets. Thus the distinction between what we are calling the
‘eventual’ MPC and what comes out of a cointegration analysis is that in principle the
cointegration analysis characterizes some average characteristics of the whole 45-year
sample, while our results re￿ect average dynamics over a much shorter horizon.
Returning to the main thrust, the simplest way to estimate the ￿eventual MPC￿ would
have been to directly report the relevant coe￿cient estimates on one-quarter-lagged @B B B
from the ￿rst-stage regressions. If that MPC had been  then the fact that  = 





where the  in the denominator adjusts for the fact that the estimated coe￿cient is on
once-lagged rather than the current change in wealth.
However, the coe￿cient estimates when only a single lag of each of the two measures
of wealth was included in the regression were a bit too sensitive to the inclusion of other
instruments for us to be comfortable relying upon them directly.
19 However, if the model
of serial correlation in true consumption growth is right, it is easy to make an alternative
18As a digression, this seems a good place to explain why we introduce the term ‘eventual’ MPC; an earlier draft called
this object the ‘long-run MPC.’ We are sympathetic to the objection that in a general equilibrium context it is not clear
what ‘long-run MPC out of wealth’ means, because in the long run the amount of wealth is endogenous with respect to
consumption choices; indeed, one interpretation of the cointegration discussion above is that the only sensible de￿nition
of the ‘long-run MPC out of wealth’ is that it is zero. E￿ectively, we are assuming that our estimates are identi￿ed by
high- and medium-frequency variation that is largely uncontaminated by the very long run general equilibrium e￿ects
that plague cointegration analysis.
19The estimates are not enormously sensitive￿they typically imply eventual MPCs between 0.02 and 0.1.14
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measure of the change in wealth that should capture the relevant facts. For a given value
of , assuming independent shocks to wealth from quarter to quarter we should have:
C C Ct  (B B Bt 1 + B B Bt 2 + 
2B B Bt 3 + 
3B B Bt 4) + "t:
Now de￿ne
 @B B Bt = (B B Bt + B B Bt 1 + 
2B B Bt 2 + 
3B B Bt 3)=C C Ct 4 (7)
and since similarly @C C Ct = (C C Ct   C C Ct 1)=C C Ct 5 this leads to an approximate equation for
@C C C and  @B B B of the form
@C C Ct =  +  @B B Bt 1: (8)
Under the assumption that the dynamic model of consumption is right, the coe￿cient
estimate on  @B B Bt should be the immediate (￿rst-quarter) MPC out of an innovation to
wealth.





for the j, j 2 ff;hg corresponding to the respective measure of wealth.
To summarize, for each of the instrument sets, the procedure is as follows:
1. Estimate (6) by IV, generating the estimate of  reported in table 4.
2. Construct the estimate of  @B B B as per (7).
3. Estimate (8) or the corresponding equation for the other instrument sets, yielding
the estimate of the immediate MPC contained in table 3.
4. Construct the estimate of the eventual MPC for table 4 via (9).
The logic of the foregoing is admittedly a bit circular, but the circularity is motivated
more by presentational issues than substance: It seemed essential, for streamlined
exposition, to be able to report a single statistic as the immediate MPC and a single
statistic as the eventual MPC out of wealth shocks. However, when only a single lag
of wealth is used in the ￿rst-stage regression the coe￿cient estimates are implausibly
sensitive to the exact speci￿cation and exactly which instruments are included. When a
few lags are used, the sum of the coe￿cients on the lags tends to yield similar immediate
coe￿cients, but is harder to summarize. Hence the compromise represented by table 3.
3.2 Estimation Results
As a baseline, the ￿rst row of table 3 presents the estimation results of the regression ( 8)
of the change in consumption @C C Ct on a weighted average of the change in wealth over the
prior year  @B B Bt 1. Thus, the regression coe￿cients are now interpretable as the marginal
propensity to consume out of changes in wealth in the previous quarter. The reported
results are for total personal consumption expenditures (PCE), because the focus here is15
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on the e￿ects of wealth on aggregate demand, but appropriately scaled-down results can
be obtained for spending excluding durables, or excluding both durables and services.
The coe￿cient estimate in this baseline model implies that if wealth grew by $1 last
quarter, then consumption will grow by about $0.017 more in the current quarter than
if wealth had been ￿at. While this wealth e￿ect is highly statistically robust, lagged
wealth growth alone explains only about 14 percent of quarterly consumption growth
(as implied by the  R2 from the regression of @C C Ct on a constant and  @B B Bt 1;:::;  @B B Bt 4
not reported in table 3).
20
The next step is to ￿nd a parsimonious set of additional variables that have signi￿cant
predictive power for consumption growth. There is a traditional set of variables often
used in this literature, dating back to the work of Campbell and Mankiw (1989),
including the recent performance of stock prices as well as lagged interest rates and
income growth rates. However, for our purposes an adequate representation is obtained
by augmenting lagged wealth with just two explanatory variables: Lagged unemployment
expectations from the University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment survey (to capture
changes in economic uncertainty), and the lagged Fed funds rate, which is included in
the hope that it will capture some of the e￿ects of monetary policy, leaving the housing
wealth variable to capture more exogenous movements in house prices.
The second row shows that when the extra variables are added, the coe￿cient on the
change in wealth is diminished (by about half). This makes sense because the extra
variables are correlated with the change in wealth. However, the extra variables also
have considerable independent predictive power for consumption growth. Overall, the
explanatory power of the regression including both extra measures is almost double the
power of the regression that only includes lagged wealth.
The third row regresses the consumption change on the change in housing and ￿nancial
wealth separately; the point estimate of the e￿ect of housing wealth is more than twice as
large as the coe￿cient on ￿nancial wealth (which is close to the original estimate of the
e￿ect of total wealth). However, the coe￿cient on housing wealth is much less precisely
estimated than the coe￿cient on ￿nancial wealth, and a statistical test indicates that
the hypothesis that the two coe￿cients are actually equal cannot be rejected at the 95
percent signi￿cance level. One reason the coe￿cient on housing wealth is harder to pin
down is that housing wealth varies considerably less than ￿nancial wealth, as shown in
￿gure 2.
The ￿nal row presents our preferred speci￿cation, in which ￿nancial and housing
wealth e￿ects are examined separately from the other explanatory variables. Results are
broadly what would be expected from the foregoing: Both coe￿cients are substantially
smaller, and the coe￿cient on housing wealth is about twice as large as that on ￿nancial
wealth, but the di￿erence between the two coe￿cients is not statistically signi￿cant.
The coe￿cient on housing wealth is di￿erent from zero, at the 0.14 percent level.
The results in this table are not the bottom line, because they re￿ect only the next-
quarter e￿ect on consumption growth. To obtain the eventual MPCs, we need to
20This does not merely re￿ect time aggregation; even twice-lagged wealth changes have highly statistically signi￿cant
predictive power for consumption growth.16
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estimate equation (6) and apply formula (9). Results of these calculations are reported
in table 4.
The ￿rst column shows that all models ￿nd a very substantial, and highly statisti-
cally signi￿cant, amount of momentum (by which we mean an estimate of  > 0) in
consumption growth. Note also that the regressions that include the extra explanatory
variables (which had much greater power for consumption growth) ￿nd notably higher
estimates of momentum. Furthermore, in experiments not reported here (but available
in the replication archive), a much more extensive set of instruments was examined. The
bottom line is that any instrument set that has a reasonable degree of predictive power
for @C C Ct (e.g., an  R2 of 0.1 or more) generates a highly statistically signi￿cant estimate
of the  coe￿cient. Furthermore, the estimate of  tends to be larger the better is the
performance of the ￿rst-stage regression.
The last two columns report the estimated eventual MPCs out of ￿nancial and housing
wealth. When the MPCs are permitted to di￿er for ￿nancial and housing wealth, the
higher immediate MPCs out of housing wealth from table 3 translate into higher eventual
MPCs here, with the preferred model estimate (the last row) of an eventual MPC out
of housing wealth of 9 cents on the dollar.
One intuition for why the MPC out of ￿nancial wealth is substantially lower than that
out of housing wealth is evident in ￿gure 2. Financial wealth is considerably more volatile
than housing wealth. If the model is really true, these high frequency ￿uctuations should
have considerable power in explaining subsequent spending patterns. In practice, high
frequency stock market ￿uctuations do not seem to translate into very large subsequent
consumption ￿uctuations, so the coe￿cient is not estimated to be very large.
21
3.3 Comparison with Existing Empirical Work
The work most closely related to ours is Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2003) (henceforth
CQS), which provides estimates from both a panel of developed countries (since 1975)
and a panel of states within the U.S. Using annual data, CQS ￿nd a highly statistically
signi￿cant estimate of the MPC out of housing wealth in the U.S. of around 0.03￿0.04.
In contrast, the CQS estimate of the MPC out of stock market wealth is small and
statistically insigni￿cant. The coe￿cient on housing wealth is estimated to be highly
statistically signi￿cantly larger than the coe￿cient on ￿nancial wealth.
But the literature does not speak with one voice. A study by Ludwig and Slok (2004)
estimates a larger e￿ect of ￿nancial wealth than housing wealth in a panel of 16 OECD
countries, and also reports some evidence of an increase in wealth e￿ects over time.
Girouard and Bl￿ndal (2001) fail to ￿nd consistent results across countries: In some, the
housing wealth e￿ect is stronger, while in others the ￿nancial wealth e￿ect is stronger
(and in some neither was signi￿cant). And a study by Dvornak and Kohler (2003)
modelled closely on the CQS study but using Australian state-level data ￿nds a larger
￿nancial wealth e￿ect than housing wealth e￿ect.
21Figure 2 actually shows levels of wealth rather than di￿erences  @B B B used in the regressions. However, the volatility
in levels is transferred into di￿erences. Consequently, it turns out that the standard deviation of the ￿nancial wealth
measure  @B B Bf is about three times as large as that of  @B B Bh.17
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It should be admitted that there are good reasons to be skeptical of results based
on macroeconomic or regional data (including our own). Foremost among these is
the previously-acknowledged point that movements in asset prices are not exogenous
￿uctuations; they should be a￿ected by many of the same factors that a￿ect consumption
decisions, most notably overall macroeconomic prospects. House prices should depend,
in part, on the overall future purchasing power of current and future homeowners,
while stock prices should re￿ect expectations for corporate pro￿ts, which are of course
closely tied to the broader economy. John Muellbauer and various co-authors ( Aron and
Muellbauer, 2006, Muellbauer, 2007, Aron, Duca, Muellbauer, Murata, and Murphy,
2008) (using Japanese, South African, U.K. and U.S. data) have attempted to address
this problem by including control variables for credit market liberalizations and other
time varying conditions. But to isolate a ‘pure’ housing wealth e￿ect, one would want
data on spending by individual households before and after some truly exogenous change
in their house values, caused for example by the unexpected discovery of neighborhood
sources of pollution.
The perfect experiment observed in the perfect microeconomic dataset is not available.
Many authors have attempted to measure housing wealth e￿ects using microeconomic
datasets, but heroic assumptions usually must be made in order to produce estimates,
because the existing datasets were not designed with this question in mind.
Given these problems, it is not surprising that the results from microeconomic studies
are even more heterogeneous than those from macroeconomic data.
Recent studies by Disney, Gathergood, and Henley (2010), Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton,
and Leicester (2008), and Campbell and Cocco (2006) represent both the wide spectrum
of views and the best available microeconomic evidence and methodologies.
Disney, Gathergood, and Henley (2010) ￿nd an MPC out of unanticipated shocks
to housing wealth of only 0.01, after controlling for expectations of future ￿nancial
conditions. They show that without such controls, the estimated MPC is considerably
higher, a result that strongly suggests that the macroeconomic correlation evident in
both U.K. and U.S. data re￿ects causality from general economic conditions to both
consumption and asset prices, rather than a direct housing wealth e￿ect.
On the other hand, Campbell and Cocco (2006) also use British data (this time, from
the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey and from regional house price surveys), but ￿nd
a large housing wealth e￿ect, which is di￿erent for young and old households; they ￿nd
a statistically signi￿cant elasticity of consumption to house prices of about 1.7 among
older homeowners, but no signi￿cant e￿ect among young renters.
Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and Leicester (2008), in contrast, ￿nd that consumption
of young renters is positively associated with house price changes, which again suggests
that both consumption and house prices are responding to an unobserved aggregate.
Additional microeconometric estimates of the wealth e￿ect are reported in Engelhardt
(1996), Juster, Lupton, Smith, and Sta￿ord (2001), Lehnert (2003), Levin (1998) and
Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2005).
Stepping back from the con￿icting details of the disparate studies, perhaps the most
useful observation is that even if it is true that the ‘pure’ housing wealth e￿ect is modest,
if a macroeconomic policymaker wants to know what to expect for future consumption18
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growth given a particular recent path of aggregate wealth shocks, it may matter more
whether the forecast is reliable than whether the mechanism is a direct wealth e￿ect, a
re￿ection of an omitted variable like growth expectations, or a re￿ection of a di￿cult-
to-measure variable like credit conditions. If, for example, a collapse in house prices
properly signals a collapse in consumption, the precise mechanism by which consumption
will collapse may not be so important.
3.4 The Relevance of Various Wealth E￿ect Channels
Despite the obvious limitations of aggregate data, we now attempt to decompose the
total response of spending to wealth into the parts due to the ￿ve channels outlined
above in section 2:
22 1. The ‘statistical’ e￿ect because the stream of housing services is
included in total PCE and depends on housing wealth, 2. The possibility that the MPC
out of a particular kind of wealth might depend on its degree of liquidity, 3. Collateral
constraints might be important; and 4. The cross-sectional distribution of wealth might
matter.
To address the relevance of the statistical e￿ect, we have re-estimated the model
measuring consumption with total PCE excluding housing services. The results are in
line with our baseline: The housing wealth e￿ect (  h = 0:070) remains highly statistically
signi￿cant and roughly twice as large as the ￿nancial wealth e￿ect (  f = 0:039). As a
caveat it is worth mentioning that this alternative speci￿cation addresses the problem
only when utility is additively separable in housing services and the rest of PCE.
23
The second and third channels are di￿cult to assess separately and are both driven
by ￿nancial innovation. Iacoviello and Neri (2007) argue that the recent increase in
liquidity of housing is captured in the higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
24 In addition,
as pointed out by Muellbauer (2007), the rise in LTV ratios (and the reduction in down-
payments) increases consumption of young credit-constrained ￿rst-time home buyers.
On the other hand, the falling relevance of credit constraints (both in terms of the number
of households they a￿ect and their extent) has likely weakened the wealth e￿ect.
25
Muellbauer (2007) constructs an indicator of credit market conditions based on the
Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan O￿cer Survey question about the willingness of banks to
make consumer installment loans (see the installment loans credit indicator in Figure 4
of his paper). Possibly because of the deregulation and restructuring of the U.S. housing
￿nance system (see e.g., McCarthy and Peach, 2002), the indicator rose markedly around
1984, a movement which likely drives much of the signi￿cant increase in the housing
wealth e￿ect reported by Muellbauer (2007). The split-sample regressions (pre-1985
22Detailed results reported in this section are available in the replication archive.
23The literature (e.g., Davis and Martin, 2005 and Piazessi, Schneider, and Tuzel, 2007) seems to agree that the
complementarities between non-housing consumption and housing services are modest.
24Muellbauer (2007), Figure 4, plots the data from the American Housing Survey, in which the LTV increased from
roughly 90 percent in 2000 to about 95 percent in 2005. In a di￿erent dataset from the Federal Housing Finance Board
(used, e.g., by Iacoviello and Neri, 2007), the LTV ratio rose by a few percentage points after 1995. Dynan and Kohn
(2007), p. 18, report that in the U.S. Survey the share of households with some debt increased from 70 percent in 1983
to 77 percent in 2004.
25Comparing pre-1983 and post-1989 U.S. data Iacoviello and Neri (2007) estimate that the income share of credit-
constrained consumers fell from 0.32 to 0.20.19
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and post-1984) we have estimated with our method con￿rm this ￿nding: The eventual
housing wealth e￿ect rose from only 0.03 to 0.12 (while the ￿nancial wealth e￿ect actually
fell from 0.08 to 0.03).
26 Much of the recent literature thus seems to agree that the impact
of housing wealth on consumption has been rising in a period (post-1985 or so) which
coincides with the intense ￿nancial innovation. This evidence is suggestive of a potential
causal link. (Of course, as in many other applications, econometric methods like ours
do not make it possible to make a ￿nal conclusion on the direction of causality.) Our
split-sample regressions thus point to a substantial role of ￿nancial innovation (channels
number 2 and 3) in determining the size of the housing wealth e￿ect. While there are
many distinct ways in which ￿nancial markets a￿ect the transmission between wealth
and consumption, on balance it does seem likely that ￿nancial innovation may have
made consumption more responsive to housing wealth shocks.
The fourth channel that might a￿ect the size of the wealth e￿ect on aggregate level
is the cross-sectional distribution of various classes of assets. Estimates with aggregate
data implicitly identify the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth averaged
across households:  = (1=N)
PN
i=1 i(B B Bi)!i, where the marginal propensity i
27 of each
consumer decreases with his wealth B B Bi (due to the diminishing role of the precautionary
saving motive), and !i is the household’s weight in the aggregate statistic. Housing
is considerably more evenly distributed than ￿nancial assets: In the U.S. Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) of 2004 the top ￿ve percent of households (by net worth)
held 26.3 percent of the total value of houses (or $5.0 trillion) but 57.9 percent of
￿nancial assets (or $12.2 trillion) (see Kennickell, 2006, Table 11a). Unfortunately, it is
di￿cult to assess quantitatively by how much the aggregate MPC out of housing wealth
would fall if we exogenously imposed that housing has the same distribution as ￿nancial
assets.
28 However, it is well-known that both housing and ￿nancial wealth of the richest
households has since 1995 grown very rapidly (see, e.g., Survey of Consumer Finances,
2007).
29 This shift has probably, if anything, weakened wealth e￿ects. However, the
change seems likely to be modest because theory suggests that the spending of the rich
people should not react much to shocks (both because of the weak precautionary saving
motive and the irrelevance of liquidity constraints).
3.5 Alternative Speci￿cations
Table 5 demonstrates the robustness of our estimates of the wealth e￿ects to three
alternative speci￿cations of the model. The top panel considers an alternative instrument
set for lagged consumption growth C C Ct 1 in (6), which consists of the growth rate of stock
26Iacoviello and Neri (2007) also report that their estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with housing
sector suggests that the response of consumption to shocks rose considerably (after 1988). Slacalek (2009) reports that
the wealth e￿ect increased (statistically signi￿cantly) after 1989 in many of the 16 industrialized countries he investigates.
27The function i() di￿ers across households because of, e.g., demographics.
28In theoretical models the marginal propensity is determined by the coe￿cient of relative risk aversion, the discount
rate, and all the other parameters of the model. The key problem in calculating counterfactual implications like this is
that the standard consumption models succeed in matching neither the upper tail of the distribution of net worth nor its
composition.
29Following the burst of the internet bubble, ￿nancial asset of most people fell somewhat between the 2001 and 2004
waves of SCF.20
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prices, change in unemployment rate, the growth rate of disposable income and the
interest rate spread. The second panel investigates the robustness of estimates of , 
and   to the inclusion of only lags t 3 and t 4 of these instruments, a procedure which
is an appropriate method under MA(2) disturbances but the instruments have lower
forecasting power for consumption growth than the baseline method. The third panel
shows the estimates from the following iterative procedure, which tests how sensitive the
estimates of consumption sluggishness  are to the wealth variable  @B B Bt. The procedure
consists of re-estimating for the second time the IV regression (6) with  @B B Bt among
instruments instead of @B B Bt and backing out the estimates of the wealth e￿ect using
the updated series for  @B B Bt, which is calculated using the second-round estimate of .
Finally, the bottom panel shows the estimates of housing and ￿nancial wealth e￿ects
implied by a model in which household wealth is split into the two components as follows:
net housing wealth is measured as real estate held by households minus mortgages; net
￿nancial wealth is measured as total assets net of real estate held by households and
non-mortgage liabilities.
30
The results suggest that the estimates of consumption sluggishness  typically lie
around 0.6￿0.7 and the estimates of the immediate and eventual marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth are roughly 0.010 and 0.05, respectively. In addition, the housing
wealth e￿ects are consistently larger than the ￿nancial wealth e￿ects and are broadly
in line with our baseline estimate of 0.09. The methods also achieve better ￿rst-stage
￿t (higher  R2) because they are based on a larger set of (valid) instruments than the
baseline estimates.
4 Conclusion
Our results suggest that, in U.S. historical experience, housing price movements have
typically been associated with substantial subsequent movements in consumer spending.
The immediate (￿rst-quarter) impact is estimated to have been relatively small (the
immediate quarterly MPC in our preferred model is about 2 cents on the dollar), but
over a time span of several years we estimate that it has on average accumulated to the
4￿10 cent range. These ￿gures are consistent with evidence from other studies and the
experience across U.S. states. Whether the housing wealth e￿ect is substantially larger
30The speci￿cation is motivated by Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles (2009), p. 17, who argue that our measure of
housing wealth is problematic because ￿more than half of ‘housing wealth’ consists of non-housing wealth￿ and claim that
this fact biases upward our estimates of the housing wealth e￿ect; they propose an alternative measure which they claim
is a better measure of housing wealth, and show that using their measure the housing wealth e￿ect is smaller. But their
measure, oddly, subtracts mortgage debt from ￿nancial assets to yield a supposed measure of ’￿nancial wealth,’ while
counting housing assets as though they were unencumbered by debt. We considered several measures of housing versus
nonhousing wealth in earlier drafts of this paper, but confess that this surprising con￿guration did not occur to us. Most
choices that we did try yielded results similar to or stronger than those we present as our baseline. For example, our
estimate of the immediate MPC out of housing wealth of 0.022 for model 7 suggests that the results are quite robust
to measuring wealth. (The eventual housing MPC is larger than for the baseline speci￿cation because of the high  for
model 7. We see no reason to change our original view that, on balance, the evidence is mildly supportive of a larger e￿ect
for housing wealth than for nonhousing wealth, but that the hypothesis that the two wealth e￿ects are equal cannot be
rejected. And, as noted at the outset of the paper, we are sympathetic to the possibility that what this literature calls a
’wealth e￿ect’ may instead be a re￿ection of a correlation between wealth and other variables that are harder to measure,
like growth expectations or credit conditions. Those are questions unlikely to be answerable using aggregate data, though
microeconomic and regional data o￿er hope of eventual resolution of the problem.)21
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than the ￿nancial wealth e￿ect is more uncertain; while the bulk of the literature seems
to point in that direction, in our estimates the size of the di￿erences is not large enough
to yield con￿dence in the conclusion.
For monetary policy purposes, these results suggest that it would be wise for policy-
makers to keep a close eye on developments in housing markets separately from equity
markets, since even the possibility of a signi￿cantly higher MPC out of housing wealth
can shift the balance of risks in a macroeconomic forecast. Such a perspective, for
example, could have helped in understanding and interpreting the surprising strength
of the U.S. consumption and residential investment spending in the early 2000s even as
the stock market su￿ered a historic decline.22
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Appendix: Description of Data
Consumption Total personal consumption expenditures; source: National Income and Product
Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
(Total) Wealth Net worth; source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Financial wealth Sum of equity by households, corporate equity by private pension funds,
government retirement fund, bank trusts and estates, closed end funds, mutual funds
and life insurance companies; source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
Housing wealth Net worth ￿ Financial wealth.
Population source: National Income and Product Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Fed funds rate source: Fred II database of St. Louis Fed, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
Unemployment expectations Question 12 of the University of Michigan Survey of Consumer
Expectations; source: Survey Research Center, http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/ .
Consumption and wealth are measured in real per capita terms, de￿ated with the consump-
tion de￿ator. All results are reported for quarterly data, 1960Q1￿2007Q4.27
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Figure 1 Reaction to a Shock to Market Wealth Followed by a Shock to Income
Growth under Frictionless and Sticky Expectations




















(a) Dynamics of the Consumption Ratio C





























(b) Dynamics of the Nonhuman Wealth Ratio B
Note: Both variables normalized with permanent income Pt. Calibration:  = 2,  = 1 # = 0:99, 1+g = G = 1:0151=4,
1 + r = R = G=,  = 0:25, wealth shock = 1, income growth shock: 1 +  g =  G = 1:0251=4.28
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Table 1 Estimates of the Wealth E￿ect in Simulated Data￿The Cointegration
Method, Frictionless Model
Ct = Bt + "t
Estimated 
True  n = 20 n = 40 n = 60
0:0137  0:0486  0:0185  0:0082




=R. Calibration:  = 2,  = 0:99, R = G=,  = 0:25,
G = 1:0151=4, G = 1:0251=4, wealth shock = 1.
Table 2 Estimates of the Wealth E￿ect in Simulated Data￿The COS Method
C C Ct = Et 2C C Ct 1 + B B Bt 1 + "t
Estimated




=R  =(1   )  =(1   )  =(1   )
0:75 0:694 0:724 0:734
0:75 0:0137 0:698 0:0117 0:741 0:0136 0:751 0:0067
Notes: Calibration:  = 2,  = 0:99, R = G=,  = 0:25, G = 1:0151=4, G = 1:0251=4, wealth
shock = 1. C C Ct 1 instrumented with C C Ct 2.30
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Table 3 Immediate E￿ect of Wealth on Consumption
@C C Ct = 0 + 1 @B B Bt 1 + 2 @B B B
f
t 1 + 3 @B B Bh
t 1 + 4MUt 1 + 5FFt 1
Next-Quarter E￿ect Extra
of $1 Change in Wealth Variables
Total Financial Housing Unemp Exp Fed Fund Test of
 @B B Bt 1  @B B B
f
t 1  @B B Bh
t 1 MUt 1 FFt 1  @B B Bf =  @B B Bh  R2
0:017 0.130
(0:004)
0:009 0:086  0:399 0.222
(0:003) (0:032) (0:209)
0:016 0:039 0.066 0.138
(0:004) (0:011)
0:008 0:018 0:082  0:411 0.271 0.225
(0:003) (0:008) (0:034) (0:211)
Notes: Sample period is 1960Q1￿2007Q4. Standard errors in parentheses. {*,**,***}=Statistical signi￿cance at {10, 5,
1} percent. Coe￿cients on wealth variables re￿ect MPCs in the quarter following a wealth change: For example, the
coe￿cient 0.017 in the ￿rst row implies that a one dollar increase in wealth in the previous quarter translates into a 1.7
cent increase in consumption in the current quarter. The wealth variables are from the Flow of Funds balance sheets for
the household sector. MU is the fraction of consumers who expect the unemployment rate to decline over the next year
minus the fraction who expect it to increase. FF is the nominal Fed funds rate. The wealth and consumption variables
were normalized by the level of consumption expenditures at t 4 to correct for the long-term trends in consumption and
wealth. The equations without the extra variables exhibited serial correlation and so standard errors for those equations
are corrected for serial correlation using the Newey￿West procedure with 4 lags.31
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Table 4 Consumption Growth Momentum and the Eventual MPC
@C C Ct+1 = c c c0 + Et 1@C C Ct + "t+1
Variables used Consumption Growth Implied Eventual
to forecast Momentum Coe￿cient MPC out of
Et 1@C C Ct  Total B B B Financial B B Bf Housing B B Bh
B B B 0:58 0.070
(0:23)
B B B, 0:76 0.048
MU, FF (0:14)
B B Bf;B B Bh 0:45 0.064 0.159
(0:20)
B B Bf;B B Bh, 0:71 0.041 0.087
MU, FF (0:13)
Notes: Sample period is 1960Q1￿2007Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. {*,**,***} = Statistical signi￿cance at
f10;5;1g percent. The eventual MPCs are calculated from the formula j=(1   ) where j is the corresponding next-
quarter MPC estimated in table 3. Standard errors for all equations are heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation robust.
When more instruments are used to forecast @C C Ct (for example, interest rate spread and the change in unemployment over
the previous year), the estimate of  tends to rise further and the standard error falls further. The measure of the change
in wealth used for the regressions is the @B B B measure de￿ned in the text, as this can be measured without an estimate of
, unlike the  @B B B measures used in the previous table.32
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